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How Rosie the Riveter led to the 1950s’ Baby Boom
The two decades following World War II were characterized by a massive upswing in birth rates in
the US and other countries – the so-called ‘baby Boom’. While the traditional explanation of the Baby
Boom is that families made up for babies that were delayed due to the war, in new research Matthias
Doepke suggests an alternative explanation. He argues that the Baby Boom of the 1950s was fuelled
by the crowding out of younger women from the labor force by older women who had gained work
experience during the war. These younger women then got married and had babies earlier, and in
greater numbers. 
Between the end of World War II and the early 1960s, the United States experienced a remarkable baby boom. The
total fertility rate (a measure of the number of children each woman will have, given current fertility patterns) increased
from just over two before the war to a peak of close to four children per woman in the late 1950s (Figure 1). The large
variations in cohort sizes generated by the baby boom have shaped the US economy ever since, including the
economic boom in the 1990s when the baby boomers were in their peak earning years, and the daunting challenges
in financing retirement and health benefits in the coming decades as the baby boomers enter retirement.
Figure 1 – Total fertility rate in the United States
While there is substantial agreement on the consequences of the baby boom for the US economy, the underlying
causes of the rise in fertility have remained controversial. A defining point in this debate is the role of World War II in
explaining post-war fertility. Initially, the fact that fertility rates started to rise soon after soldiers returned home from the
battlefields suggested to many that the baby boom may be due to families making up for the babies they did not have
while husbands were serving in the military. However, a detailed look at the data reveals that this mechanism can
explain at most a small fraction of the baby boom. Fertility peaked in the late 1950s, and most of the rise in fertility is
due to young mothers under the age of 25. Hence, the mothers who gave birth at the peak of the baby boom were
mostly too young to be married to men who served in the war. Given this mismatch, for many years research into the
causes of the baby boom has focused on mechanisms unrelated to the war, such as innovations in household
technology or the consequences of the Great Depression.
In recent research with Moshe Hazan and Yishay Maoz, we argue that the World War II was responsible for the baby
boom after all, albeit through a more subtle mechanism than the desire for kids of returning soldiers. In our view, much
of the baby boom can be explained by the ramifications of World War II for women’s labor market opportunities.
Indeed, the war was a watershed moment for American women’s role in the labor force. As the men were fighting in
Europe and Asia, millions of women joined the labor force, and they were responsible for a large part of the rise in
wartime production. Women had been working before the war, too, but almost exclusively in their early twenties before
getting married. The big change during the war was that older married women, including those with children, also
entered employment.
The surge of female employment during the war proved to be a watershed, because many women who joined the war
production effort liked the experience, and decided to stay in the labor force even after the men returned home.
Hence, in the two decades after the end of the war we observe a large increase in the labor supply of married women.
Now as far as explaining the baby boom is concerned, pointing out that the war increased female employment may
appear to make the puzzle even bigger – after all, having children and having a job are two activities that compete for
time, so that a rise in female employment generally tends to go along with fewer babies. However, the key to our
argument is that the surge in female employment had opposite effects on two different cohorts of women: the war
generation of women old enough to work in World War II, and younger women still in school during the war who would
reach childbearing in the late 1940s and 1950s.
The women of the war generation benefitted from the additional work experience, and thus continued to work at high
rates throughout their adulthood. In contrast, women in the younger cohort had a much harder time finding
employment, because they had to face strong competition from the experienced war generation. Before the war,
female employment was the almost exclusive domain of young, single women. As these women married they used to
free up jobs for the next generation. In the post-war years, in contrast, many jobs were already taken by the older
women, resulting in dire employment prospects for the following cohorts.
With the older women dominating the labor market, young women were crowded out, and had to look for something
else to do. Many of the younger women adjusted by getting married and starting to have babies a little earlier than
they would have had they been employed. Ultimately, they ended up building bigger families with more children. It is
the story of these younger women that explains most of the baby boom.
Figure 2 – Total labor supply by younger (20-32) and older (33-60) women in the United States (as a
percentage of labor supply by men in the same age group)
Our account of the baby boom is consistent with the observation that the employment of younger (i.e., childbearing
age) and older women moved in opposite directions after the war (Figure 2). Evidence on variation in the baby boom
across US states is also consistent with the mechanism. States with higher mobilization rates (i.e., a higher fraction of
men joining the armed forces) had a larger surge in female employment during the war and a larger rise in fertility
after the war. A final piece of evidence comes from variation across countries. Many countries were affected by the
war, but only a few countries experienced a large rise in wartime female employment. We should expect the post-war
baby boom to be large only those countries where female employment surged. The evidence lines up precisely with
this prediction. Canada, New Zealand, and Australia are the three countries with a war time experience very similar to
the United States, in terms of a large rise in female employment and also in terms of the absence of major war time
destruction (which may have a separate effect on post-war fertility). Figure 3 shows that the baby boom was large and
similarly timed in all of these countries. In contrast, in the neutral European countries (which also escaped war time
destruction, but didn’t experience a rise in female employment), there is no pronounced rise in fertility after the war
(Figure 4).   
Figure 3 – Completed fertility rates (i.e., average number of children per woman in a given birth cohort) in the
United States and allies with a similar war experience.
Note: The baby boom corresponds to birth cohorts (i.e., birth year of the mother) 1920-1940. 
Figure 4 – Completed fertility rates (i.e., average number of children per woman in a given birth cohort) in the
United States and neutral countries.
Note: The baby boom corresponds to birth cohorts (i.e., birth year of the mother) 1920-1940.
Today’s demographic challenges are quite different from those of the baby boom period; notably, many industrialized
countries now suffer from extremely low fertility rates, population aging, and population decline. Nevertheless, our
work suggests that the key tradeoff that drives fertility today, namely between work and careers on the one hand and
childbearing on the other hand, was equally responsible for explaining fertility trends during the postwar baby boom.
This article is based on the paper “The Baby Boom and World War II: A Macroeconomic Analysis ” in the Review of
Economic Studies. 
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